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Abstract: In the United States, today’s ranches are engaging in small-scale nature-based 
endeavors to diversify their income base. But the geographic boundary of the land they 
own creates a relatively small area within which to operate, and fragmented ownership 
diminishes the ability of any single landowner to produce nature-based income. Collective 
action among nearby landowners can produce a set of resources from which all members 
of the group can profit. Such action can enhance the economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability of grasslands and the populations that use them. This article shows that 
common-interest communities can be used to provide and allocate wildlife and other 
resources on ranchlands, enabling individual landowners to generate more income from 
selling nature-based experiences to customers. Common-interest communities are familiar 
in urban settings but they have not yet been used in this setting. Thus, the article proposes 
a new approach to ranchland management based upon a familiar set of largely private legal 
arrangements. More broadly, the article illustrates the relevance of private law and private 
property to sustainable development by explaining how property owners can use private 
law to engage in environmentally beneficial and economically profitable enterprises on the 
vast privately owned landscape of the U.S. Great Plains. 
Keywords: common-interest communities; collective action; law; rural development; 
servitudes; natural resources; wildlife 
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1. Introduction 
Cattle are not the only income source for today’s ranches. One important alternative or 
supplemental source of income is the consumer who is willing to pay for access to places that offer 
nature-based recreational activities such as hunting, wildlife viewing, hiking, or the solace that comes 
from spending time on America’s grasslands. Consumer demand for these sorts of opportunities can 
hardly be argued [1]. The interests that lobby for various laws governing the use and protection of 
natural resources are comprised of people who care about these resources—people who are likely 
willing to pay to enjoy them. People also spend a great deal of money travelling to our public lands. 
Even conservation research and education centers produce substantial economic benefits from 
consumers taking part in their activities, as Edwards and Thompson have recently found [2]. Leases 
for hunting access are also evidence of consumer demand in areas of the midwest [3]. However, 
consumer demand for nature-based activities remains a largely untapped source of income on the 
Northern Great Plains’ privately owned grasslands. 
From a conservation perspective, privately owned lands are tremendously important. As Morrisette 
explains [4] (p. 374), 
There are few intact ecosystems today that exist solely on public lands. And yet, in some cases 
there are still remarkably intact ecosystems that exist almost exclusively on private lands.  
One-quarter of all ecosystem types are inadequately represented on federal lands, and seven 
percent are not found on federal lands at all. Most of the wetlands in the contiguous United 
States are privately owned. Approximately half of all threatened and endangered species in the 
United States are found exclusively on private lands, and 20 percent of the remainder spends 
half of their time on private lands.  
The Northern Great Plains includes parts of Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming and 
Montana in the United States and parts of the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta [5]. 
Spanning approximately 723,000 square kilometers, only 2% of the region consists of public lands 
managed primarily for biodiversity conservation, while 76% of the land is in private ownership and 
approximately 64% of the privately owned land is devoted to livestock grazing [5]. 
A great deal of the land used for grazing is currently in its native or semi-native habitat; thus, it is 
one of the few areas in the world where there is an opportunity to conserve a grassland ecosystem at a 
large scale. The area is so important that the World Wildlife Fund has designated it as a ―Global 200 
ecoregion—one of the 238 most biologically significant places on Earth‖ [6] (p. 19). Most of the 
native grassland consists of mixed-grass or shortgrass prairie. As Edwards describes (p. 5), ―While 
estimates differ, it appears that in the northern Great Plains only about 1% to 3% of the original 
tallgrass prairie remains intact, perhaps 20% to 30% of the mixed-grass prairie, and 40% to 70% of the 
shortgrass prairie‖ [7]. And while this ecoregion may lack the grandeur of the land to its mountainous 
west, it is spectacular upon closer examination. As Davidson explains (pp. 1, 21), ―Prairie is one of the 
most subtle and complex of ecosystems, and to those who have taken the time to get to know it, there 
is nothing comparable. What to the untrained eye may seem to be a simple monoculture is in fact one 
of our most diverse sources of plant, soil, insect and animal life‖ [8]. 
Sustainability 2010, 2              
 
 
2322 
The need for conservation on the Northern Great Plains is pressing. Its privately owned grasslands 
are being converted to cropland at an increasing pace due to high commodity prices (attributable to a 
variety of factors like biofuels policy) [8] and government programs [6] (p. 54). Livestock production 
can also cause significant damage to the biodiversity of the region. Traditional grazing practices are 
not suited to certain grassland bird species, and grazing in riparian areas results in degradation. In 
addition, native grazers like prairie dogs and elk are eliminated or their populations capped in favor of 
cattle production, and large carnivores are largely missing from the landscape [6] (pp. 58–59). On 
these lands, wildlife is eliminated or managed as a pest to be reluctantly tolerated. It is not often 
viewed as a valuable resource.  
Although the landscape is important and the need pressing, implementing conservation policy on 
the Northern Great Plains is difficult. Producers often decry conservationist interference with their 
operations by claiming that producers are the best stewards of the land. But history shows that 
producers are unlikely to produce the ecosystem goods and services that we need to ensure a healthy 
and prosperous future. Indeed, if we are entitled to those goods and services, these stewards are not 
merely reluctant providers; they are causing a great deal of harm [9-11]. Non-point source pollution 
and nutrient loading in our nation’s waterways is but one example of environmental damage that 
undercuts producers’ stewardship claim.  
The stewardship claim is not, however, unfounded. Farmers and ranchers have a deep love for the 
landscape they have toiled on and against for so many generations; they rely upon biological processes 
for their livelihoods; and almost all maintain that they want to give it to their children. Moreover, our 
understanding of production agriculture’s environmental consequences grows as time goes on, so 
informational deficiencies may be partly responsible for producers’ shortcomings. However, one key 
problem remains: the biological processes from which producers profit have been narrowly defined by 
the markets they serve. Thus, producers’ management choices respect nature to the extent it makes 
economic sense. Protecting downstream water quality creates no income for producers. Carbon storage 
has made no money, until recently. And, importantly for my purposes, habitat and biodiversity losses 
are not lost opportunities but gains in productive capacity. 
However, times are changing. Ecological services markets are emerging as a preferred policy 
choice for maintaining or enhancing the environmental benefits that flow from privately owned lands, 
including farms and ranchlands [12-15]. Using consumer demand for nature-based activities is another 
market-based means of attaining environmental ends. If managed differently, this ecoregion could 
support diverse and flourishing populations of vegetation and animal life. In its current state, the land 
is managed primarily for cattle because ranching is the owners’ main source of income. But if a 
rancher could make his or her ranchlands more multifunctional, he or she could charge consumers for 
access to nature-based activities. Such an enterprise would, in turn, add value to wildlife and the other 
resources that consumers will pay to experience. That increased profitability would help stem the 
current tide of high commodity prices and sodbusting, while helping alleviate some of the 
environmental consequences of grazing. Thus, conservation on the privately owned landscape of the 
Northern Great Plains may be as much about rural development as it is about environmentalism. 
The notion of finding a beneficial correlation between environmental benefits and rural 
development is not new. Rural development proponents have often touted agri-tourism, eco-tourism, 
or simply tourism as a piece in the puzzle of maintaining a vibrant rural economy [16,17]. Sometimes, 
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however, producers do not embrace this notion of rural development because they view themselves as 
food, fiber, and fuel producers. They may not feel that they and their ancestors endured a great many 
difficulties—settling the American West, the Dust Bowl, cyclical farm crises, and many other personal 
hardships—to provide a tourist experience. They may believe they have a higher calling: feeding the 
world. But given rural population loss, fluctuating income, and the absence of opportunities for adult 
family members to stay on or return to the ranch, the general desire to maintain business as usual may 
fade in favor of non-traditional income opportunities [18]. 
Signs of nature-based entrepreneurship are emerging, even in areas where policy makers have not 
intervened to create markets. The Switzer Ranch [19] operation, near Burwell, Nebraska, is one 
example of multi-functionality driven by consumer demand. The Switzer family began diversifying its 
ranch in 2001 by building lodging for guests and offering horseback riding, guided hunting, bird 
watching, and boating services on a nearby river. The family formed Calamus Outfitters [20] as a way 
of marketing these new endeavors. Today, Calamus Outfitters offers a wide range of experiences for 
the paying customer seeking to experience the beauty of Nebraska’s Sandhills region, including its 
flora, fauna, wildlife, and ranching heritage. Importantly, the Switzers continue to raise cattle, which 
belies any rigid dichotomy between conservation and production [21]. 
Internationally, privately owned areas that are devoted to nature-based tourism and recreation have 
already emerged as a viable means of nature conservation [22]. While such efforts are relatively new 
to the grasslands of the United States, places like Namibia, Kenya, Botswana, Venezuela, and Brazil 
have working examples of nature-based entrepreneurship on their privately owned lands [21,23-28].  
Non-governmental organizations are also recognizing the link between conservation and rural 
development. The World Wildlife Fund is one example [18], and it has proposed standards for 
privately owned conservation land [5]. 
As elsewhere, there are challenges confronting nature-based entrepreneurs on the Northern Great 
Plains. In order for ranchers to provide unique opportunities—opportunities above and beyond what 
one already finds in an environment managed predominantly for agricultural production—geographic 
size is critical [7]. Ranchers with relatively small tracts of land may be unable to offer much, if 
anything, unique. The acquisition of more land is an option. However, there are a variety of reasons for 
exploring other options, not the least of which is to avoid concentrated land holdings on our rural 
landscapes. In fact, the preservation of prosperous rural populations may require a different option [29]. 
The Switzers have encountered the size problem. Wildlife provide the foundation for parts of their 
business. The presence of wildlife depends on how the grassland is managed at a large scale. If the 
Switzers’ grassland-management choices extended beyond the reach of their 12,000 acre property, 
wildlife populations could rise and become more diverse. Access to neighboring lands would also open 
up more opportunities for hunting, camping, bird watching, and other land-based activities. To that end, 
the Switzers have sought the cooperation of neighbors to enhance the presence of wildlife on their and 
their neighbors’ ranches, offering their customers a geographically and ecologically broader 
experience. Environmentalist organizations have noticed the benefits of the Switzers’ effort. Recently, 
the Audubon Society designated the Switzers’ property along with cooperating neighbors’ property as 
an Important Bird Area called the Greater Gracie Creek Landscape. It is the first privately owned site 
in Nebraska so designated [30]. 
Sustainability 2010, 2              
 
 
2324 
Lawyers and the legal academy have not offered a discussion of the legal tools that would enable 
people like the Switzers to work across property boundaries with willing neighbors. This article starts 
to fill that void. It also contributes to the literature concerning how private law and private property 
can be used to tap consumer demand for recreational opportunities on the Northern Great Plains. 
Operating from a baseline of fee simple property ownership, landowners can reorder the rights they 
have within a sufficiently large geographic area to promote biological diversity and enhance their 
ability to partake of this income stream. As this article explains, the ―common-interest community‖ is 
a possibility for collective action. While most commonly found in urban areas as a means of creating 
and selling communities within cities, these associations have attributes that may help deal with some 
of the challenges facing ranch owners. 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a general discussion of the challenges facing 
nature-based entrepreneurs in ranch country. Section 3 contains an extended discussion of the legal 
options available for meeting these challenges, with primary emphasis placed on utilizing a  
common-interest community. 
2. Challenges 
This section provides the context necessary for understanding the need for the approach described 
in Section 3. It first discusses some of the challenges facing landowners who seek to profit from 
nature-based activities on their properties, showing that many of those challenges are collective action 
problems involving resources that are or would be common among neighboring landowners (2.1). As 
collective action problems involving common resources, the challenges landowners face can be 
thought of as provisioning and allocation problems, which are discussed next (2.2). Often provisioning 
and allocation problems can be solved by creating a collaborative institution. Effective and long-enduring 
institutions for collective action often exhibit certain fundamental traits, which I set forth at the end of 
this section (2.3). Section 3 describes how collective action can be ordered to deal with provisioning and 
allocation problems through a mechanism for collective action called a common-interest community. 
2.1. Challenges Facing Nature-Based Entrepreneurs 
There are three primary challenges to nature-based entrepreneurial efforts on ranchlands: 
entrepreneurial risk, operational difficulties, and geographic size. The first challenge arises from the 
entrepreneurial nature of these enterprises. The return that ranchers are likely to receive from their 
efforts is inherently uncertain at this point. With active commodity markets, ranchers can make 
investments with some idea of what the likely return will be and the time horizon associated with it. 
But the return from providing the sorts of opportunities described in this article is less well known. 
This challenge is largely beyond private law’s purview. That is, landowners cannot solve these 
problems through any particular legal arrangement among themselves. Government or NGOs could 
help deal with this problem by subsidizing this new sort of production or buying the output but 
landowners cannot avoid this risk through collective action. Nonetheless, this uncertainty should 
inform the legal arrangement. For example, flexibility should be built into these sorts of ventures so 
that they can be undone if things do not pan out. 
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The second primary challenge is operational. Managing land for its landscape or wildlife value is a 
new concept to many landowners, and it involves complex questions of conservation biology [31]. Many 
landowners may not be experts in managing their lands to produce the sorts of ecological goods and 
services that will ultimately attract paying customers. Further, a particular practice may take years to 
pay dividends, and certain practices—for instance controlled burning on unstable soils—may 
necessitate land retirement for an entire grazing season. Without a viable means of dealing with these 
problems, landowners may be unwilling to enter this market. 
These problems can be met to some extent through collective action. By joining together, ranches 
may be able to share the costs associated with new management practices, delayed returns, and 
developing or hiring the necessary expertise. Public land-grant universities or NGOs can also develop 
and disseminate information necessary for this sort of production. 
The third and most salient challenge facing landowners is the geography of property or, more 
specifically, the physical boundaries associated with land ownership. This boundary problem is 
common to ecosystem governance in general [32]. For instance, with governmental approaches to 
solving environmental and natural resources problems, the lines we draw on landscapes in the form of 
political boundaries are problematic when a problem transcends those boundaries. So-called  
cross-border collaboration among governmental entities is thus a common subject in the public  
sector [33]. The issue also arises in the private sector, where the relevant lines are property  
boundaries [32]. Depending upon the opportunity that the rancher would like to sell, a large amount of 
land may be necessary. For instance, managing a habitat for a sizeable herd of large mammals takes a 
large amount of land to accommodate their home range. Most individual ranchers will not have enough. 
For species with habitat needs that do not necessarily cross property boundaries, expanding the 
geographic size of the operation is likely to increase diversity simply as a function of including a more 
diverse array of habitat types. Thus, to the extent income increases with diversity and the presence of 
large mammals, bigger is better. 
Ecological and efficiency scales can also ensue from getting bigger [34] (p. 80). As Elmendorf  
states (p. 549), ―The ecological benefits of a given form of investment increase more than 
proportionately with the number of contiguous acres subject to treatment‖ [35]. If income increases 
with ecological benefits, bigger is again better. And larger size opens up the possibility of allowing or 
replicating ecological processes that are impossible or less effective at small scales, like prairie fires or 
the grazing pattern of a herd of wild ungulates [5] (p. 76). 
Producers are also reluctant to invest in the production of ecological goods and services  
within a limited geographic area because the benefits of their investments may spill beyond their  
boundaries [34] (p. 80). Habitat creation and management is, again, an example. If an investment in 
habitat is made (e.g., by constructing new facilities or changing one’s grazing practices), neighboring 
landowners may reap some of the benefits of increased wildlife populations while sharing none of the 
costs of increasing that population. These extra-territorial benefits do not generate a return so long as 
they remain extra-territorial. A landowner will only invest in activities that produce a return on his 
own land. Again, expanding the territory involved helps deal with this problem. Of course, some 
spillover is likely to remain. The challenge is to expand the territory to a level where the  
intra-territorial benefits generate a sufficient return. 
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This territorial-benefits problem is related to two sorts of participation problems—hold outs and 
defectors. At the start of an operation, the prospect of free-riding provides an incentive to hold out [34] 
(p. 76). If a landowner can get the benefits without incurring any of the costs of joining, it is unlikely 
he will join. If that is the case, and if that landowner is necessary to the collective effort, then the 
project does not materialize. In this article, I assume a group of ranchers wishes to cooperate, so I 
largely assume the absence of holdouts. Even on that assumption, however, an incentive to defect 
arises among cooperating landowners. Any landowner may decide to defect, ending his or her 
participation to take advantage of the established practices in the short run without making 
contributions that would serve the long-term interests of the group. 
Fortunately, we have existing legal tools to deal with problems related to geographic size. Many 
landowners typically see this problem as one that can be solved only by acquiring more land, and high 
land costs can keep many out of this line of business. However, land acquisition is not necessary. It 
would be, of course, if a landowner needed to acquire the complete set of rights we bundle into the 
concept of property ownership. But landowners seeking to engage in nature-based entrepreneurial 
activities on their own land need only a few of the rights associated with the neighbor’s property. They 
do not, for instance, need the right to occupy the neighbor’s property to grow crops or live in a 
dwelling. Rather, they need only those rights that are necessary to their endeavor. For example, in 
order to produce and maintain an increased presence of wildlife, an individual needs a method for 
ensuring that management practices on nearby lands are adapted to provide suitable habitat and 
assurances that this will continue for a sufficient period of time. Given property’s typical geography, 
the owner’s own management choices are insufficient to create the resource and the owner has  
no ability to make management decisions on the neighbor’s land. Thus, the landowner needs a  
portion—but only a portion—of the neighbor’s property rights. And the neighbor needs a portion of 
his property rights if he also wishes to create the wildlife resource. 
This limited exchange of property rights holds the promise of joint gain, allowing cooperating 
landowners to create together what neither of them can accomplish on their own. Once they have 
overcome the physical boundaries between their properties, cooperating landowners can also achieve 
greater ecological benefits at a lower cost within a larger territory, and they are more assured that their 
investment returns will materialize within their collective boundaries. 
However, even if landowners can overcome territorial boundaries for management purposes, 
property boundaries still cause problems. For instance, if all of the benefits of a joint effort were to 
materialize on one property owner’s property, the resulting inequity could ruin the cooperative effort. 
Thus, a further portion of the landowners’ property rights can be exchanged—one that gives each 
landowner limited access to the other’s property to capitalize on the wildlife resource they have created. 
The effort at collective action can also be marred by individual activities that damage the 
availability or value of the resources for other cooperating landowners. And the problem of defection 
looms. Thus, further rights and obligations need to be crafted. 
2.2. Provisioning & Allocation 
Cooperating landowners face collective action problems involving the creation and use of common 
pool resources—resources common as to group members but from which the group can exclude  
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non-members. Ostrom’s two categories of issues facing collective action are helpful  
in thinking about the problems facing landowners in this context. Her categories consist  
of (1) provisioning problems and (2) allocation problems [36]. With provisioning problems, the main 
concern is the production of the resources that the individuals within a group will use. Allocation 
problems arise when multiple parties carry on activities that use the resources available to group 
members in common. Thus, allocation issues center on managing use to guard against harming the 
resources being allocated. 
Provisioning problems initially involve a choice about what exactly the group wants to produce 
together. Landowners must answer a fairly simple question: ―What can we do together that we are 
unable to do on our own?‖ The clearest candidate for provisioning is wildlife. Cooperation is 
necessary primarily where an individual cannot effectively provision adequate wildlife resources 
within his or her own boundaries. Thus, all willing participants must contribute to its production by 
collectively managing their land to provide a habitat suitable to the species or array of species they 
seek to provision. Those cooperating landowners will also need a means of determining who will bear 
what provisioning costs. 
Allocation problems arise after the common resource is created. The most apparent allocation 
problems are associated with the wildlife resource and relate to maintaining the resource base in the 
face of consumption. As I discuss below (3.3) many states allocate the consumption of certain species 
through hunting laws. Such laws play a key role in maintaining the wildlife population. However, in 
some instances, the state’s allocation determinations may not be made with the geographic boundaries 
of the cooperating landowners in mind. Thus, for instance, a group of cooperating landowners that 
successfully attracts hunters with state-issued permits may face the prospect of over-consuming the 
local resource base without harming the resource base of a larger region. If that is the case, the parties 
will need to determine how many animals of a given species can be hunted without harming the local 
population, despite the state’s role in allocation. And, of course, if the state plays no allocation role 
with regard to hunting a particular species, then the parties will bear full responsibility for allocation. 
In addition, regardless of the state’s role in allocating consumption to maintain species’ populations, 
the parties will need to determine how hunting opportunities will be distributed among the cooperating 
owners. And they will need to determine whether and under what conditions landowners may access 
each other’s property for hunting. Given the mobility of the resource base, limiting each participant to 
hunting on his own land may prove inadequate. 
The mobility of the resource base poses other allocation problems as well. Not all uses of the 
wildlife resource will involve consumption. For example hiking, camping, and horseback riding 
experiences may be more valuable when wildlife is present. If wildlife appear on some properties and 
not others, access for these activities is something that should be allocated among the parties who 
created the wildlife resource. In addition, such an allocation must take care to avoid damage to the 
resource. Thus, the parties may want to control overcrowding at campgrounds or on trails. 
Wildlife aside, nature-based activities like hiking, camping, and horseback riding can also raise 
provisioning and allocation problems. The first question facing the parties will be whether or not they 
want to cooperate to create a common resource, like a cross-boundary trail or campground open to 
other participants. If they do not need the cooperation of neighbors to create the resource, then neither 
provisioning nor allocation problems arise. But they may need to cooperate in those instances where 
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no landowner can create the resource on his own or where the landowners can create a better resource 
by cooperating. For instance, cooperation on large landscapes with regard to these activities could 
enable the parties to create better trails, campsites in optimal locations relative to trails or 
infrastructure, and aesthetically pleasing landscapes. If this is something the landowners create through 
cooperation, they will have to deal with problems like determining who will bear what costs in creating 
and maintaining these shared resources (a provisioning problem) and how each party will be allocated 
access to this resource to avoid diminishing its value (an allocation problem). 
2.3. Institutional Design 
People often solve provisioning and allocation problems through institutional arrangements, and 
there is a growing body of work evaluating successful collective-action institutions. As I explain below, 
the common-interest community is, in essence, an institution that can be used to solve the provisioning 
and allocation problems that arise in this dynamic context. Thus, considering this work is important to 
thinking about how a common-interest community might be constructed. Ostrom has identified [36]  
(p. 90) [37] (p. 259) eight design principles that exist in many long-enduring self-initiated institutions 
for collective action among relatively small groups of individuals: 
1. Clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of the resource system (e.g., irrigation 
system or fishery) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units 
are clearly defined. 
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules specifying the amount of 
resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules 
requiring labor, materials, and/or money inputs. 
3. Collective-choice arrangement. Many of the individuals affected by harvesting and 
protection rules are included in the group who can modify these rules. 
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behavior, are 
at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 
5. Graduated sanctions. Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from 
officials accountable to these users, or from both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanism. Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, 
local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of users to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have  
long-term tenure rights to the resource. 
Ostrom’s eighth design principle—that multiple layers of nested enterprises be responsible for 
appropriation, provisioning, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities—is 
most often observed in large complex systems. I therefore omit this principle from the following 
discussion, but it should be noted that a layered or federal structure may emerge as necessary if a 
collective effort grows to a large enough size or if there is a need for coordination among many groups 
of cooperating landowners. Below, I consider the legal options for solving provisioning and  
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allocation problems and constructing institutions that meet the first seven criteria, focusing mainly on  
common-interest communities. 
3. Legal Arrangements 
The legal options for dealing with these issues exist in a spectrum. Below, I describe the ends of the 
spectrum in general terms (3.1) to place the primary focus of this paper—the tools available for legally 
formalized landowner-initiated governance regimes—in context. From there, I settle on property law 
as a tool to analyze collective action in the grasslands context and explain how the common-interest 
community could deal with the provisioning and allocation problems identified above through an 
institution that meets Ostrom’s design principles (3.2). This section ends with brief discussions of 
possible legal reforms (3.3), additional roles for common-interest associations on grasslands (3.4), the 
distinctions between common-interest communities and land trust arrangements (3.5), and the utility of 
formalized private-law arrangements in this area (3.6). 
3.1. The Legal Landscape 
The spectrum for dealing with provisioning and allocation problems runs from purely informal 
arrangements among groups of landowners on one end to governmental involvement on the other. In 
purely informal arrangements, landowners as a matter of custom manage their lands for the presence of 
wildlife and allocate access for hunting, open lands for camping, and so on. Such customs may extend 
to both provisioning and allocation problems. However, in such a setting there is no formal means  
(e.g., resort to the courts) to enforce the land management regime or govern individual uses of the 
resources. This is not to say that such efforts are ineffective. Rather, they may be highly effective 
within a community with strong social ties [38,39]. And one would expect to find Ostrom’s traits 
among such effective institutions. 
At the other end of the spectrum is governmental involvement. Government—which represents the 
collective will of a particular geographic area—can utilize its lands to provision wildlife and open its 
lands to users. On privately owned lands, governmental involvement can involve regulations that 
require owners to provision wildlife and open their lands to others, subject to constitutional limitations 
requiring compensation to landowners in some instances. Government can also control the allocation 
of resources through permit requirements, controls on the size of campgrounds, land use regulations, 
and a variety of other methods. The prospect of direct governmental provisioning and allocation of 
nature-based activities on the Northern Great Plains is somewhat small because less than 25% of this 
region is publicly owned. Moreover, less than 2% of the land area is both publicly owned and managed 
for biodiversity conservation. Indeed, most governmental approaches in this region consist of costly 
land purchases, placing politically unpalatable (if not constitutionally suspect) regulatory burdens for 
wildlife provisioning on landowners, and more successful efforts at incentive programs [40]. 
In between these two approaches is the prospect of formal collaboration among landowners. Four 
different legal tools are available. The first is contract law. Unlike purely informal arrangements, 
contracts are legally enforceable between the contracting parties. In the event of one party’s breach, 
the payment of monetary damages is the preferred remedy [41] (p. 769). Contractual obligations do not 
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ordinary extend to succeeding landowners; thus, the sale of a cooperating ranch will end part of the 
cooperative effort.  
The second tool is property law. The property-law approach is similar in one key way to contract 
law and different in two important respects. At their core, property-law approaches to organizing 
collective action are contractarian in nature. The parties creating a property-based regime for resource 
allocation or provisioning may create an agreement that meets their needs and observes Ostrom’s 
principles. The key differences between property law and contracts are the abilities to (1) vest the 
rights and duties of agreeing landowners in the title to the real estate (not simply among themselves) 
[42] (p. 470) and (2) enforce performance of the obligations in the event of breach, rather than limiting 
the parties’ recovery to monetary damages [42] (pp. 490–491). As a result, these rights and duties can 
be enforced by and against subsequent owners of the affected real estate. For this reason, property law 
may be a superior choice when it comes to creating long-term tenure rights in the resource system that 
the parties create. As Ostrom has noted in her seventh principle, this is an important trait among  
long-enduring institutions. 
The third tool is business-association law. Landowners could, for example, form a legal entity to 
which they would transfer title to their real estate in return for ownership interests in the entity. Once 
created, individual landowners would no longer own the real estate, but they would own shares of the 
entity owning and managing the real estate. Provisioning and allocation decisions could be made at the 
entity level. Of course, using a firm model in which multiple landowners are transformed into one 
institutional owner eliminates the need for cross-border collaboration. But it does not eliminate the 
problems associated with collective action. Thus, the institution created (the firm), should observe 
Ostrom’s design principles in its internal governance, and the parties will have the ability to do so 
because business associations are largely contractarian.  
The final tool is legislation enabling landowners to form a governmental entity—a special  
district—that is empowered to raise revenue and govern landowner activities to deal with provisioning 
and allocation problems [34,35,43,44]. Special districts are quasi-governmental, but they have aspects 
of a business association undergirding them because they are typically created to perform a narrow 
function and act in a proprietary capacity. Unlike purely private law approaches, this approach needs 
specific enabling legislation which, hopefully, would observe Ostrom’s principles. This approach is 
also unique in its ability to overcome the holdout problem identified above in a way that none of the 
other mechanisms can [35]. Specifically, the formation of these districts can be statutorily designed to 
allow a quantum of willing landowners within a proposed geographic area to form the entity and 
include unwilling participants within its boundaries. 
These four basic tools are not mutually exclusive. For instance, informal arrangements may be 
sufficient to provide the resources that a given operation needs, but perhaps a contract is necessary to 
govern allocation and access. Similarly, a property-based regime may work well for a group of 
landowners in need of heightened provisioning, but entity or governmental involvement might be 
better for allocation purposes. Thus, no single approach mentioned above should be taken as complete 
or isolated. 
There are also many different legal arrangements that lawyers can create using these four tools, 
each with different parameters. For instance, the choice of a particular business association (e.g., a 
corporation, a limited liability company, a trust, etc.) may be influenced by tax policy and the 
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particular state’s law governing such entities’ operations and authorized activities [45]. Within the 
property law setting, there are a number of ways to vary what we loosely refer to as property rights, 
including, for example, conservation easements and leases [42]. And special districts are as varied as 
they are common [46] (pp. 31–34). 
Regardless of the approach selected, multiple choices will need to be made about what rights and 
duties should be created and how Ostrom’s principles can be integrated into the structure. Thus, the 
capacity of the tool to accommodate the parties’ needs emerges as a key consideration. In terms of the 
parties’ autonomy to choose the terms of their arrangement, contract and property regimes are the most 
accommodating. Business associations follow closely behind. Special districts’ ability to accommodate 
the parties’ needs depends on the parameters of the legislation creating them. Because they are created 
by legislation, the scope of their authority is determined through political processes involving people 
other than cooperating landowners. 
3.2. The Common-Interest Community 
Common-interest communities are one example of formally ordering collective action that uses 
property law to deal with provisioning and allocation problems. I do not claim that a common-interest 
community is superior to other choices. Rather my point is to consider the capacity of a  
common-interest community to meet landowner needs in this setting in a way that ensures success 
under Ostrom’s principles for institutional design. This focus is therefore somewhat narrow, but it can 
help landowners think about the issues that they will face. We also have experience creating and 
operating these institutions in other contexts, specifically in conjunction with residential developments. 
But, most importantly, this approach may help individuals in the private sector generate and capitalize 
upon nature-based activities that have historically been thought of as within the ambit of government. 
With the appropriate mechanisms in place, private law and the market can generate some of the 
environmental benefits that public-law approaches seek to generate. Realizing this potential is a strong 
argument for the institution of private property. Operating from a baseline of private ownership need 
not stifle conservation efforts. Rather, the legal tools available to landowners to vary their ownership 
rights allows for innovation that can achieve good wildlife outcomes, enhance ranch profitability, and 
foster the development of rural communities. 
This section first describes a common-interest community in conceptual terms (3.2.1). It then 
discusses how the servitudes underlying a common-interest community could be used to deal with the 
provisioning and allocation problems a group of landowners may confront (3.2.2). However, the 
shortfalls inherent in a common-interest community built solely on servitudes counsel in favor of 
creating an institutional arrangement for solving provisioning and allocation problems. So I discuss 
how a common-interest community’s association can be used to overcome those shortfalls and observe 
Ostrom’s principles (3.2.3). The discussion of a viable common-interest association that observes 
Ostrom’s principles continues with coverage of institutional control (3.2.4), revenue powers (3.2.5), 
and enforcement issues (3.2.6). 
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3.2.1. The Common-Interest Community Concept 
The common-interest community is a generic term for what most laypeople understand as the 
homeowners association used in residential development. In essence, these communities are founded 
upon rights and duties that inhere in the title to real estate and affect the property owners individually 
and collectively [47,48] (Chapter 54 & 54A). 
Individual ownership of a parcel of land within a common-interest community obligates the owner 
to engage in and refrain from certain land uses. For instance, in the urban setting, the construction and 
maintenance of the dwelling is often regulated, with an eye toward the aesthetic impact of the 
structures built on the property. Ownership of a parcel within the community also entitles the owner to 
membership in a community association. That association, in turn, may hold common property and 
maintain it for the benefit of the association members or perform certain functions for each owner. 
Bike trails, parks, and exercise facilities are typical examples of association property held for the 
benefit of the owners in common. Trash collection, snow removal, and lawn care are examples of 
services performed by an association for its members. 
The association also performs administrative functions. It is primarily charged with the enforcement 
and administration of the restraints or obligations placed on individual owners. For instance,  
a landowner within a community that contains a restriction obligating each owner to seek  
pre-construction approval of a structure’s design will seek such approval from the association—the 
entity representing the communal interest in each individual parcel. A landowner whose lawn or fence 
fails to comply with the covenants governing such matters would be detected and punished by  
the association. 
These associations typically fund their activities with payments that landowners are obligated to 
make to the association as an incident of their ownership of an individual parcel. This revenue stream 
is then spent according to the direction given by the documents creating the association or the 
decisions made by the association acting under those founding documents. Increasingly, many 
associations are using the revenue they receive to provide services to the individual owners that were 
historically provided by government. 
The specific parameters of a common-interest community are driven by the needs of the parties 
creating it, and the law governing these associations is flexible. Thus, Hyatt describes practice in this 
area as ―box building.‖ Clients have particular goals, values, experiences, and tolerance levels that 
impact how their effort should be structured. The lawyer’s job, as Hyatt puts it, is to build a box that 
suits their needs and helps them achieve their goals. It needs to have the features they need and want, 
but without accessories that are useless or, worse, problematic [49]. 
Given the many variations that will emerge in the grasslands setting, it is difficult to posit how a 
particular common-interest community should look. However, there are some general aspects that bear 
discussion as a means of thinking about such a group’s needs. What follows is a discussion of those 
aspects of common-interest communities, using the Restatement (Third) of Property for its legal 
foundation [50]. The Restatement, of course, is not law, but it is a helpful source of general principles 
and, importantly, vocabulary. Practitioners obviously know that the legal rules in their states may 
differ in certain respects from those restated in the Restatement. 
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The first attribute of a common-interest community is its foundation—the servitude. The thing we 
call property is essentially a bundle of rights that individuals hold as an incident of land ownership. 
The term ―servitude‖ under the Restatement (volume 1, p. 9), is a ―generic term that describes legal 
devices private parties can use to create rights and obligations that run with the land.‖ In essence, 
servitudes are a way of moving some rights from one owner’s bundle and transferring them to 
someone else—here, other landowners seeking to collaborate. The property right implicated by the 
need for wildlife provisioning, for example, is the ability to use one’s land as he chooses. When a 
servitude places an obligation on an owner to manage his land in a particular way for the benefit of his 
neighbors, it has transferred one of the rights in his bundle and placed it in his neighbors’ hands. The 
same obligation placed on all lands in the group, with benefits that run to each of the other landowners, 
is a reconfiguration of the rights in the various bundles of each owner’s property. Servitudes allow this 
sort of reconfiguration, allowing conceptual slices of property to move among the parties to the 
agreement [51] (pp. 842–846). 
But moving slices of property in this way does more than reconfigure rights and obligations among 
the parties to the agreement. The slices become part of the property each landowner owns; they are a 
reconfiguration of the rights and obligations attending property ownership, regardless of who owns the 
property. One of the most important aspects of the rights and duties created with servitudes is their 
ability to run with the land. As the Restatement puts it (volume 1, p. 9) ―Rights and obligations that run 
with land are useful because they create land-use arrangements that remain intact despite changes in 
ownership of the land.‖ [50]. That is, a properly created servitude binds the land and, thus, the owner 
of that land, including subsequent owners who did nothing more than purchase the property. Because 
these rights and obligations run with the land, duration emerges as an important consideration. There 
are good reasons for establishing a termination date or a time for renewal, but the security that 
servitudes can provide to the enterprise is helpful. That security can, in turn, help attract funding for 
conservation efforts, spur individual investment, and, obviously, keep landowners from defecting to 
seek short-term gain without the assent of the group. 
3.2.2. Provisioning and Allocation through Servitudes 
Ostrom’s first principle states that it is important to clearly define boundaries of the resource system 
and the individual rights to the resources created within that system. Thus, any effort at provisioning 
and allocation must take care to identify what precisely the parties seek to collectively provision and 
the individuals’ allocation rights. 
With regard to provisioning problems, servitudes can be placed on all landowners within the group 
establishing the rights and obligations the parties conclude are necessary to the provisioning activities 
they choose to undertake. With regard to wildlife, for instance, each owner should agree to manage his 
or her land in a way that enhances and supports the wildlife population for the benefit of other owners 
within the group. The servitudes can also grant each landowner access to each other’s properties to 
conduct use activities like hunting and wildlife viewing. With regard to trails and campgrounds, the 
parties can configure the obligations associated with construction and maintenance. 
Allocation problems can also be addressed through servitudes. Thus, the servitudes may place 
limitations on the number of visitors, the amount of game that can be harvested, the timing and 
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intensity of use activities like hiking, horseback riding, and camping, as well as other matters falling 
within the realm of allocation problems. 
The need for clarity and the number of provisioning and allocation issues that parties may confront 
complicate matters for landowner groups in the grasslands context. In other settings, deciding on the 
rights and obligations necessary to make the project work is not all that difficult. It is not particularly 
difficult, for instance, to come up with a set of restrictions that limit the types of grass to be planted in 
lawns or that limit the height of, or the materials to be used in, fences. Both correspond to the idea of 
beauty (or the potential for profit) employed by those drafting the servitude. Matters are not that 
simple with managing grasslands for the purpose of enhancing the presence of wildlife and using those 
lands for ranching and nature-based activities. The science of grasslands management will be of keen 
importance, but there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning what land uses will and will not be 
beneficial to the overall effort. Intensive grazing, controlled burns, introduction of species, stocking 
ratios, fencing and fence removal, and a variety of other aspects of land management will be important. 
And operating at a large scale may mean that some lands will need to be treated differently than others 
because of their physical location or ecological significance. Inventorying species will be an important 
step in making management choices and, depending on the data, provisioning obligations and 
allocation rights may need to change over time. Further difficulties are likely to ensue from the 
uncertain nature of the returns certain activities may yield, as well as uncertainty concerning the level 
of use that pooled resources can sustain. Indeed, experimentation and adaptive management may be 
the only truly workable approaches to effective provisioning and allocation in this context. [31,32] 
Unlike the residential property setting, where manicured lawns and no-wood fences for every parcel in 
the development correspond to a collective view of beauty or have been proven in the marketplace to 
enhance value, the outcomes here are more uncertain and the choices associated with generating those 
outcomes can be complex. 
Dealing with this complexity can be accomplished by engaging experts and fashioning the 
servitudes at a highly detailed level, requiring landowners to perform certain practices and allow 
certain levels of use. This has the upside of some level of certainty, but the prospect of change or 
failure must be adequately taken into account. To do so, at the least, an amendment mechanism should 
be employed [47] (pp. 455–457). Thus, the landowners would be given the power to amend the 
servitudes under a set of procedures spelled out in the servitude. The requisite quantum of owners 
involved in the amendment process could vary from majority rule (by participant or by acreage or 
whatever) to unanimity. Again, the choice would be one for the group. Detailed servitudes would be 
consistent with Ostrom’s first principle of clear boundaries, and an amendment mechanism could be 
drafted in a way that observes her third principle of collective choice. 
A further level of complexity emerges, however. Allocation decisions are often influenced by the 
contributions that each member makes to provisioning the common resource. Ostrom makes this 
relationship explicit in her second principle: an effective collective action institution maintains 
proportionality between the benefits and costs experienced by individuals within the group. Thus, the 
provisioning obligations and allocation rights contained in a set of servitudes should be crafted in a 
way that ensures proportionality between costs and benefits. Achieving this congruence between 
relatively complex provisioning and allocation choices brings a further level of difficulty to the parties. 
For instance, valuing a provisioning contribution could quickly raise questions of the metric by which 
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it should be judged (e.g., by the environmental benefits flowing from the improvement, the costs 
associated with it, or both). Determining the value of allocations could involve similarly difficult 
questions. And those two difficulties are both present when one seeks to maintain proportionality 
between provisioning costs and allocation benefits. Again, an amendment mechanism would be an 
important means of maintaining proportionality between costs and benefits going forward. 
However, given the potential complexity of the rights and duties at issue and the need to maintain 
proportionality, it may not be feasible to state the provisioning obligations and allocation rights at a 
high level of detail. There will likely be a need to continually adapt provisioning measures and adjust 
allocations. Indeed, it may be that the enunciation of standards or goals (as opposed to rules and 
concrete obligations) is nearly all that can be set forth with any certainty at the outset. Moreover, the 
creation of obligations and rights does little to ensure enforcement and does not give the parties any 
sort of a financing mechanism to help pay enforcement or management costs or hire assistance. 
However, a common-interest association can solve many of these problems or at least give the parties 
a means of dealing with them. 
3.2.3. Common-Interest Associations 
Servitudes for common-interests communities often create a common-interest association with 
governance and revenue-raising authority [52]. The association can be formalized as a separate legal 
entity (for example, as a limited liability company, corporation, or trust) or it can exist as an 
unincorporated association [48] (p. 54A-18). In any event, the servitudes will vest each member of the 
group with membership in the association as an incident of their property ownership. The association 
is then vested with the authority to administer the servitudes.  
The common-interest association is a good option for dealing with the complexity of the obligations 
involved in this context. An association can be empowered and limited in whatever way the parties 
deem appropriate. For instance, the association could be vested with the power to contract with experts 
in habitat and wildlife to seek input on what measures are likely to yield the greatest return, thus 
helping the parties deal with the operational challenges mentioned above. More importantly, using an 
association can allow the parties to frame obligations at a fairly broad level. That is, the servitudes can 
provide the association with discretion to determine what landowners must do in order to attain their 
collective goals, leaving sufficient leeway to engage in an adaptive effort. By vesting individual 
landowners with membership in an association that will, in turn, administer servitude obligations 
within the group, the landowners can free themselves from the need to enunciate fine-grained 
servitudes spelling out each participant’s rights and obligations. Rather, the association’s power to 
create rules concerning provisioning and allocation can be set forth in the servitudes along with an 
obligation for each landowner to abide by those rules. In essence, then, the landowners will create an 
entity through which they may govern themselves, creating and adjusting the rights and duties 
necessary to adequately provision and allocate the resources at issue and maintain proportionality 
between costs and benefits for individual participants. 
An analogy can be drawn here to the issue of design standards for houses built within residential 
common-interest communities [47] (pp. 345–347). In some instances, the servitudes impose specific 
requirements on landowners within the development to use certain materials or build to a minimum 
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size. However, beyond those parameters, care must be taken to ensure that homes being built do not 
diminish the value of surrounding properties. In this regard, many servitudes that govern residential 
common-interest communities empower the association to review plans for proposed structures and 
require landowners to get that approval before they start building. Standards are often set forth at 
whatever level of specificity the developer chooses, and it is good practice to define the standards in 
terms that are as concrete as possible. But to a greater or lesser extent the association (the members 
acting collectively) are given the discretion to approve or deny proposals based upon those standards. 
The same principles can be employed in the grasslands setting. 
3.2.4. Voting, the Right Level of Association Discretion, and Collective-Choice Problems 
The use of an association does not, however, relieve the parties of the need to develop clear rights 
and obligations for the participants, as Ostrom has observed as her first principle of successful 
institutions. Rather, it simply provides a vehicle through which specificity can be developed and 
adapted to the needs of the parties and the success of the effort. In broader terms, of course, the lessons 
of public governance are applicable to private-governance design. Procedure, minority rights, 
decisionmaking standards, and the like are all elements of good government. They are elements of 
good governance as well. In creating these regimes, the practitioner and participant should be careful 
to avoid what they deem the pitfalls of government and strive to incorporate its most laudable aspects. 
This effort at private governance is, after all, limited largely by what level of collective control the 
participants will tolerate within these communities. 
The question of how much discretion to give an association—how broadly or narrowly to frame the 
servitudes that the association will administer—depends in large part on the level of control each 
individual member will have in the association. Control will be determined though (1) the voting rights 
that each member has and (2) the quantum of votes necessary to take a particular action. The 
servitudes will make each landowner a member of the association and give him or her control in the 
form of voting rights. The allocation of voting rights need not, however, be ―one person, one vote.‖ 
Perhaps each member should have equal say. But a group could easily conclude that each member’s 
share of control should be determined according to the acreage he or she holds. Or perhaps each 
member’s share of control should depend upon an environmental benefits index that would, in turn, 
provide a further incentive for the creation of such benefits on the lands involved. Additionally, the 
quantum of voting interests necessary to take a particular action could vary from a bare majority to 
unanimity and could vary according to the type of decision at issue. 
The possibilities are numerous, but the general idea is one of a governance structure that 
administers the obligations and entitlements created through the servitudes. In the grasslands context, 
the benefits of democratic private governance are similar to those in other contexts. It is a means for 
collective choice with a particular set of goals in mind. It provides, in essence, a mechanism for 
community-level control of land uses impacting others within the community. To the extent a 
landowner is satisfied with the process (if not the result) and is assured of a continuing voice in the 
association’s operation, he or she is more likely to join the collective effort, remain engaged, and resist 
the temptation to defect. 
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This sort of a governance regime has the sort of stakeholder participation that Ostrom has observed 
in her third principle: participants affected by allocation and provisioning rules are included in the 
group who can modify these rules. All landowners are affected by the rules they create through the 
association and they have the power to change those rules when they see a need for it. 
Although the subject is too broad to engage meaningfully in this article, significant difficulties can 
arise when one considers association control in light of the need to maintain proportionality between 
benefits and costs. An economic incentive exists for those in control to take more than their fair share 
from the enterprise. Thus, the challenge facing the parties is to create a structure in which controlling 
participants are less likely to expropriate benefits from minority interests. 
There are at least six potential checks on this sort of opportunism. The first is the choice to exit the 
arrangement. For example, termination provisions could be used to protect minority rights. But if 
minority interests are given a tool by which they can keep controlling interests in check, then the 
potential arises for those minority interests to use their authority and expropriate undue benefits from 
the majority. Another form of exit is each individual’s ability to sell the land to a new owner. But exit 
through sale may do little more than give the seller the ability to find a willing buyer who will discount 
their purchase price in light of the problems the new buyer will be likely to encounter. So selling the 
property does little to protect the seller from majoritarian overreaching. The second check has to do 
with the level of discretion afforded the association. Perhaps the parties will choose to limit the 
governance authority of the association in relation to provisioning and allocation questions. But 
spelling out such matters in detail within servitudes poses the problems I’ve discussed above. The third 
has to do with the quantum of votes necessary to take action on provisioning and allocation questions. 
Unanimity would, of course, avoid majoritarian overreaching. But deadlock could ensue. The fourth 
has to do with the allocation of voting power. Perhaps a creative lawyer can fashion a mechanism 
vesting control among members based on their relative contributions to the enterprise. But there are 
significant metric problems that could arise. The fifth has to do with the longevity of the enterprise. 
Perhaps over the long term, power shifts, contributions, and benefits will balance despite a disconnect 
between costs and control. But the parties have no assurance that will happen, nor do we know the 
time frame in which it might happen. 
The sixth, and perhaps the most likely, check is the social settings in which these enterprises are 
likely to emerge. Perhaps landowners will be as concerned about what their neighbor gets as they are 
about what they get. Such a phenomenon is not unheard of within close communities or small 
enterprises. On the other hand, social ties often cut both ways. Neighbors fall out of favor with one 
another and seemingly unrelated conflicts can trickle into association governance and decisionmaking. 
In the end, there may be no good way to deal with this problem. However, participants should discuss 
the issue and think about how they want to deal with it in designing their institution.  
3.2.5. Revenue Powers 
Very often, servitudes in a common-interest community involve an obligation to pay money to an 
association to fund association activities. The servitude may spell out (or the association may be given 
the authority to determine) the amount of the fee, the metric for its calculation, and the purposes for 
which the revenue may be spent. This can give the group a means of financing its activities, sharing 
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costs at a communal level. Obviously, it will take money for the association to undertake certain 
improvements. For instance, the removal of invasive species could be financed through the association. 
Each owner’s stake in the operation could also be solidified by his or her payment to the association 
and the expectation that the funds will be spent on improvements or maintenance that inure to the  
landowners collectively. 
The need to keep costs and benefits proportional for individual participants can be enhanced with a 
revenue mechanism, thus providing an additional means of observing Ostrom’s second principle 
concerning the link between provisioning costs and allocating benefits. Compensation from 
association revenue for disproportionate landowner provisioning (which benefits the association as a 
whole) can be used to keep provisioning and allocation congruent. For instance, suppose one area of 
land within an association needs to undergo a controlled burn, but the loss of acreage for the time 
period associated with the practice will be particularly detrimental to one or more ranchers. The funds 
generated for the association through the payment of dues could be spent to help compensate the 
individual rancher for his or her lost income without having to reallocate the resource entitlements  
to maintain proportionality. In short, compensation allows for congruity without continually  
altering allocations. 
Lost income, of course, is just one metric by which disproportionate costs can be detected. Others 
would include comparing the value of a member’s provisioning activities to the value of a member’s 
allocation. As mentioned above, determining those values can become a complex task, but an 
association can be given the discretion to experiment as it determines when and how its revenue 
should be distributed.  
Alternatively or additionally, revenue obligations to the association could be calculated based on 
resource-based income and used to compensate members for their provisioning activities, perhaps in 
lieu of altering access rights among individual properties. This sort of a fee structure would 
redistribute some members’ income to those members who contributed to provisioning the resources 
but were unable to realize the benefits, perhaps due to a lack of access to those resources. This would 
also help keep benefits and costs proportional among the members and could be used in instances 
where landowners are unwilling to give their neighbors access to their properties. Identifying how 
compensation should be distributed would also involve the selection of a metric for valuing 
provisioning contributions. 
3.2.6. Enforcement Principles 
Participants should also consider enforcement provisions in designing a common-interest 
association. Three objectives are particularly important: (1) providing a quick and low-cost means of 
conflict resolution, (2) having accountable monitors, and (3) punishing violations with proportionate 
sanctions. All of these relate to the idea of enforcement. 
Ostrom has observed in her sixth principle that many successful collective action institutions 
involve ―[u]sers and their officials [who] have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict 
among users or between users and officials.‖ [37] (p. 259). Judicial enforcement of the obligations and 
rights created in a private law setting is the default means of resolving conflicts in the United States. 
Such a forum can be time consuming and often costly, but it is often local given the way state  
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courts are organized. Alternative dispute resolution techniques, like arbitration, are an alternative. 
Additionally, the servitudes could set up a dispute resolution process within the association. That, in 
turn, could be designed with low-cost and rapid-response considerations in mind. Dispute resolution 
could also occur informally, which may be likely in this setting. 
Ostrom has also observed in her fourth principle that successful institutions often have ―monitors, 
who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behavior, are at least partially accountable to the 
users and/or are the users themselves.‖ [37] (p. 259). Such institutions, under her fifth principle, punish 
violations of allocation and provisioning rules with graduated sanctions that depend on the seriousness 
and context of the offense. An association monitoring the activities of its members would provide the 
sort of self-governance that Ostrom has found elsewhere. Graduated sanctions could be formalized in 
an association’s founding documents or simply imposed by the association as it operates. The 
Restatement also explicitly recognizes in Section 6.8 the ability of common-interest associations to 
―adopt reasonable rules and procedures to encourage compliance and deter violations‖ [50]. In so 
doing the association should observe the principle of graduated sanctions. 
3.3. Possible Legal Reforms 
One key benefit of a common-interest community approach to solving allocation and provisioning 
problems is the ability to utilize existing legal tools. There is no need to wait for large-scale legislative 
reforms before embarking on a private sector effort. However, the role of the state is not altogether 
irrelevant to organizing collective action using existing private-law tools. As Ostrom has concluded in 
her seventh principle, the long-term success of collective-action institutions depends in part on the 
absence of external government resistance to the institution [37] (p. 259). Under this principle, users 
must also have the ability to create long-term tenure rights in conjunction with the resource [37]  
(p. 259). The ability to create such long-term tenure rights depends in part on governmental 
recognition and protection of those rights. Thus, one must examine the level of governmental support 
for these efforts even though government is not the primary actor. The line between public and private 
is, after all, somewhat fleeting. 
There are two primary concerns that arise here. The first is with the history of regulation concerning 
wildlife in the United States. The second is with the law of servitudes. I address these concerns and 
possible legal reforms for each below. Overall, however, the need for legal reform is far from clear. 
The United States has a long history of individual land ownership that sanctifies individual choice with 
regard to excluding others from within one’s geographic property boundaries and gives landowners a 
great deal of freedom to determine how their lands are used. Thus, to the extent we are simply talking 
about ordering land uses in the private sector, government may not challenge that authority and the 
ability of ranchers to create long-term entitlements. But given the confluence of land use, wildlife, and 
servitude law, concerns exist. 
The history of governmental control over wildlife resources raises the prospect of challenge by 
external governmental authority. Many states currently allocate access to wildlife resources through 
permit mechanisms or other sorts of hunting regulations. In Nebraska, for example, allocation of large 
game species like deer is made through a permitting system in which non-transferrable permits are 
sold to hunters or distributed to landowners. Geographic limits on permits enabling a permitee to take 
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a particular species within a given geographic area are also a common feature of regulated hunting. For 
other types of game, like upland birds, hunting is restricted to a particular number of days and a limit is 
placed on the number and sex of the species that each individual hunter can take. Regardless of the 
particular approach, game utilization is highly regulated, with an underlying ethic that game is public 
property to which individuals are given access on the government’s terms [53] (pp. 160–161).  
Title 163, Chapter 4, of the Nebraska Administrative Code—the Nebraska Game and Parks 
Commission’s regulations pertaining to wildlife—is a good example of allocation regulations [54]. 
Given this state of affairs, government may resist the sort of effort posited here. 
However, in some states landowners are becoming more involved in game management. For 
instance, in Colorado, landowners do receive transferrable hunting permits that they can sell [55]. Thus, 
the private sector may be emerging as an important part of wildlife management. Further support for 
this claim can be found in the recently enacted Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive 
Program, administered by the Farm Service Agency within the United States Department of 
Agriculture. A product of the 2008 Farm Bill, this program provides grant funding to state 
governments ―to encourage owners and operators of privately-held farm, ranch, and forest land to 
voluntarily make that land available for access by the public for wildlife-dependent recreation, 
including hunting, fishing, and other compatible recreation and to improve fish and wildlife habitat  
on their land, under programs administered by State or tribal governments.‖ [56] (p. 39135).  
That grant money is, in turn, used to compensate landowners for granting access to the public for  
nature-based recreation.  
Given the need for making progress on privately owned lands, the system could be changed to 
further decrease the prospect of challenge by external governmental authorities. A strong argument can 
be made that no permitting system should be necessary for game hunting within a common-interest 
community like that mentioned above. All landowners within it have an incentive to manage game 
populations for their own benefit and will make the allocation decisions necessary to sustain their 
effort. Indeed, we do not require a permit to slaughter a certain number of cattle. Much the same could 
be said for game within associations where the game benefits landowners. 
However, scrapping permit systems for game hunting would be a somewhat dramatic change in 
American wildlife law. American law is replete with laws regulating hunting, including hunting on 
private property. Depending on the species, game management can take a variety of different forms, 
but it is seldom the case that landowners are left with absolute discretion to hunt or allow others to 
hunt a particular species. Perhaps the only examples of such an unregulated approach are those species 
that are regarded as pests or those that a landowner concludes are damaging his or her property [57]. 
Indeed, it may not be good policy to eliminate the state’s wildlife management role. State-level data 
collection and management can be used to control external impacts, for instance with regard to game 
that travel beyond the common-interest community’s boundary. And, as in the cattle industry, there 
may be public health issues associated with wildlife management that necessitate state involvement. In 
this context, the additional prospect of landowners focusing on certain species and species’ traits 
provides a further level of concern if biodiversity conservation is a policy goal. Many states have also 
developed the knowledge and facilities necessary to make management decisions. Thus, it may be 
more efficient to preserve the state’s wildlife management role, perhaps in the form of requiring 
common-interest communities to submit wildlife management plans to a state agency for its approval. 
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Moreover, the political support of public wildlife managers has been an important ingredient in the 
emergence of these institutions in countries like Namibia [24] (pp. 31–32). Thus, providing a role for 
public wildlife agencies in the development of these institutions may benefit landowners, as well as  
the public. 
Another option for state involvement is to have it calculate game allocations. Thus, it could 
determine the overall numbers of species that can be harvested within the common-interest 
community’s boundaries. Further allocations could then be made by the association among the various 
landowner members. In conjunction with such a unitized allocation, a number of transferrable permits 
could be issued to the association or to the landowners within the association. To the extent a 
permitting regime remains, the transferrable permit could be sold in conjunction with the association 
or landowner’s operation. In any event, state allocations to associations, perhaps in conjunction with a 
set of standards the association would need to meet to qualify for the issuance, would provide a strong 
incentive to form these groups. It would also acknowledge governmental support and allay participant 
concerns about governmental challenges. A governmental commitment in the form of legislation 
would also stabilize the association’s long-term tenure rights in the resources and lessen the threat of 
governmental interference with their operations. 
The law of servitudes may also need some change in order to solidify landowners’ ability to create 
long-term tenure rights. Here, the law is somewhat murky. The law of servitudes is a complex 
doctrinal area that I have generalized and simplified for purposes of this article. In reality, there are 
various conveyances involved in the present context. To the extent we are talking about giving others 
the right to enter another person’s land for a particular purpose (hunting, camping, or whatever) or take 
game from the property, the law of servitudes is relatively clear in allowing landowners to create such 
rights and duties, and it enforces those rights and duties among subsequent owners of the real estate. 
However, one aspect of servitude law raises concern. Concern arises when a landowner attempts to 
obligate himself and successive owners to pay funds to a common-interest association, maintain the 
property for wildlife habitat, or provide suitable habitat. Historically, courts have refused to enforce 
some use restrictions and affirmative obligations on subsequent owners of real estate [58]. The 
doctrinal grounds and their policy rationales vary, but many courts have been concerned about the 
threat such obligations pose to the value and alienability of land as well as to the free use of land by 
subsequent owners. Modern courts have eroded these doctrines because of the importance of servitudes 
to land development and the benefits they can be used to create, but judicial reluctance to enforce these 
sorts of obligations still exists in some states [52]. In those states where this remains an issue, legislation 
could override the judicial rules. Alternative approaches, like special districts or entity ownership 
arrangements, should also be considered in such states. 
3.4. Doing More with Common-Interest Communities 
Thus far, this article has focused on the common-interest community and its attendant association as 
a collective governance mechanism. Through such an arrangement, multiple landowners can come 
together to provide for common resources and decide upon the allocation of those resources in a way 
that transcends the geographic property lines between their properties. I have assumed that each 
landowner would utilize the allocated resources to provide income to their own operations. However, 
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there are a number of permutations that can arise once the landowners start collaborating across their 
property boundaries.  
For instance the discussion above assumes that the servitudes will benefit and burden each 
landowner reciprocally and that the association would decide on the finer points of provisioning and 
allocation. However, another option would be to make the association the beneficiary of all the 
obligations placed on the properties. Thus, the association would have access to the properties for 
hunting, hiking, wildlife viewing, camping, or whatever other uses there are of the provisioned 
resources. Under this sort of an arrangement, the association could operate more as a business venture 
and determine how to distribute the revenue to the association’s members. In other words, the 
allocation function of the association would turn from ordering the allocation rights of individuals  
in a resource to distributing earnings to the individuals. This approach would be very close to a  
business-association approach described briefly above, even though each landowner would continue to 
own his or her ranch. 
One could also envision a scenario under which the association contracts with a third-party outfitter 
to use the resources that have been effectively pooled at the associational level. The payment such an 
outfitter would make to the association in return for this utilization would then be distributed to the 
association’s owners. 
Common-interest associations also often hold common property—land or structures owned 
collectively by the group through the association. Such an arrangement may be helpful in this setting if 
the landowners would like to collectively acquire more land or jointly build facilities to assist them in 
their efforts.  
The association can also act as a focal point for dealing with other entities. For instance, the 
association could compete for grant money that is to be spent on wildlife habitat. A group of 
landowners operating through an association that has some level of control of a vast acreage may 
compete very effectively for such funding. 
An interesting example of this structure is the NamibRand Nature Reserve in southwestern Namibia [24]. 
Although it operates on a not-for-profit basis, its organizational structure entails an arrangement 
whereby individual landowners retain the fee title to the real estate. The owners, however, have joined 
the reserve (a sort of association that the landowners govern) and have given it the authority to utilize 
and manage the property for biodiversity conservation. In addition, the reserve grants concessions to 
third parties that conduct low-impact ecotourism activities on the property in exchange for a fee. That 
fee is used by the reserve to cover its operating costs and any surplus is retained for further 
conservation efforts. In a for-profit enterprise, of course, that surplus would be distributed to  
the members. 
3.5. Distinguishing Conservation Easements and the Land Trust Model 
The common-interest community approach is somewhat similar to the conservation easement and 
land trust model that is common in the United States. Airey provides an excellent legal overview of 
this model [58]. Basically, a conservation easement is one type of servitude and a land trust is typically 
the beneficiary of such easements. A land trust holds the development rights on property that the 
owners have agreed not to develop. The landowner still retains possessory rights and the underlying 
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fee to the realty, along with the ability to use the land for agricultural or other permissible uses. The 
land trust is typically a non-profit organization that holds and enforces the easement. 
As mentioned above, there is some uncertainty about the long term enforceability of these 
servitudes in the grasslands context. The same was true of conservation easements. Thus, conservation 
easements are a common subject of specific legislation enabling their use. Under the enabling 
legislation, conservation easements can only be held by specific entities, typically governmental 
entities and charitable organizations. The adoption of that legislation is also complemented (and 
perhaps driven) by federal tax provisions that allow for an income tax deduction for the value of a 
conservation easement donated to a qualifying charitable organization. A condition commonly allowed 
in the enabling legislation (and required by federal tax law) is that the easement be perpetual. 
There is, of course, much more to the land trust model than what I have set forth here, not the least 
of which is federal income tax treatment [59,60]. But two primary distinctions between the  
common-interest community approach and the land trust model are worth mentioning. First, it may not 
be possible to create the sorts of servitudes that ranch owners will need for this effort while satisfying 
the requirements of state conservation easement legislation. However, most states allow a great deal of 
leeway in how the parties frame the obligations and rights under a conservation easement, so that 
distinction may not be as significant as the second. 
Second, the governing entity is different. The common-interest community approach would involve 
the formation of a common-interest association among existing landowners. The land trust model, by 
contrast, would likely involve a land trust or charitable corporation that is controlled by third parties. 
Thus, the land trust may fall outside the community of landowners and be controlled by people who do 
not share the same interests or values as the landowners. Interjecting a value set that is different from 
those who are subject to the servitude may complicate matters. 
Landowners could solve this second complication by forming their own qualifying entity and 
conveying conservation easements to it. To do so, however, the parties must be able to function as a 
charitable entity. In Nebraska, for example, qualified non-governmental holders of conservation 
easements must be charitable corporations or trusts [61]. In the grasslands context, one driving force 
behind the effort is to increase the profitability of the landowners within the enterprise. And, in some 
instances, the association may carry on the profitmaking venture. In the latter arrangement, charitable 
status is non-existent. In the former, it is still questionable. 
3.6. The Relative Benefits of Formalized Private-Law Arrangements 
The private-law collective-action approach described here stands in contrast to the regulatory 
approach of controlling land uses for the benefit of species and habitat. The goal of environmentally 
sound and biologically diverse landscapes can be achieved through governmental regulation of 
resource use. However, even though the goals of such an effort may be laudable, it often encounters 
landowner resistance. Such resistance can take the form of claims for compensation for the ―taking‖ of 
one’s property or simple political resistance to the notion of governmental interference. One upside of 
the approach presented here is its grassroots effort at achieving good environmental outcomes in an 
economic system that allows producers to profit from the spending public’s demand for these 
important places. In that sense, government does not dictate the result; the market produces it. This 
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does not mean, however, that the governmental role is absent or insignificant. The legal regime within 
which an association operates is, after all, backed by the state. 
It is more difficult to determine whether or not a formalized private-law approach is better than an 
informal arrangement among landowners. One could argue that these regimes are only likely to exist 
(let alone thrive) in communities where a high level of informal control already exists. Even then, 
however, the effort at formalization has utility. First, formalization carries with it enforcement 
mechanisms that may be superior to those that exist with informal efforts. Second, formalization 
requires the parties to think rigorously about the issues facing the group. The effort at formalizing the 
group’s effort is thus formative and, hopefully, produces a workable framework within which the 
community can better achieve its goals. Finally, a formalized legal arrangement is more likely to 
garner governmental recognition and cooperation. That, in turn, may open up opportunities for  
better environmental outcomes than are achievable through informal arrangements or purely  
regulatory approaches. 
The newly created Cooperative Conservation Partnerships Initiative, administered by the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) within the United States Department of Agriculture, is an 
example of federal funding that may work well in this area [62]. The program, created by the 2008 
Farm Bill, allows for the NRCS to partner with producer associations and other entities to deliver 
program funds to individual producers for conservation practices and improvements [63]. A  
common-interest community like that described here may qualify as a producer association and may be 
eligible to partner with the NRCS to support federal funding for producer’s efforts. 
Another possibility is the newly created Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive Program 
mentioned above. A group of cooperating landowners may compete well for such funding, depending 
upon how the state grantees structure their efforts at promoting wildlife and wildlife habitat within 
their private lands programs. 
4. Conclusions 
The common-interest community may be a viable means of facilitating collective nature-based 
entrepreneurial efforts on ranchlands. It can provide the participants with the benefits of 
geographically larger operations without purchasing additional land, a governance mechanism for 
making provisioning and allocation decisions in an adaptive context, a revenue device for spreading 
the costs of management practices or improvements among the participants, and the opportunity to 
generate income from utilizing the resources they have created. Participants will need to think about 
whether the profit-making enterprise is to be conducted at the association level, and there are 
numerous other factors that must be considered in setting the parameters of the servitudes and the 
structure of the association. In the end, however, none of these challenges is particularly 
insurmountable. A group of motivated ranchers who see value in providing nature-based  
opportunities can overcome them. If successful, their ranches may become more multi-functional and  
more profitable. 
Ranchers on the Northern Great Plains are, of course, not alone in this effort. As I mentioned at the 
outset, there are a variety of examples across the globe. The literature cited in this article helps collect 
these valuable lessons, which will be helpful in making a sustained effort at private-lands conservation 
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in the United States [21-26,28,64]. On the institutional design front, of course, we have many 
examples of working endeavors in other contexts in the United States. From grazing associations to 
cooperatives, and from inland fisheries to groundwater management districts and homeowners 
associations, the ability of people to do together what they cannot do alone and to avoid Hardin’s tragedy 
pervades. This paper brings some of this together. But there is much more to be done. 
More broadly, private-sector involvement in producing and offering opportunities to experience 
important and unique ecosystems is a subject that should not be ignored in the debates concerning the 
proper balance between private property and governmental control of natural resources. Creating broad 
rights of landownership and fragmenting a landscape with property boundaries, as we have done in the 
United States, does not necessarily lead to tragic results in the long term. Indeed, we may be at a place 
in our development of the Great Plains where consumer demand for natural places can operate to 
reconfigure the boundaries of property ownership to produce the ecosystem goods and services that 
consumers and the public value. 
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